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Victory for a World Pariah: Analysis
and Criticism of Barclays Bank v.
Franchise Tax Board of California
Douglas S. Pelley*
Introduction
OnJune 20, 1994, the Supreme Court declared an end to the long-standing
dispute between foreign multinational corporations and the state of Cali-
fornia. California won.1 Since the early 1970s, California has taxed mul-
tinational corporations 2 using a tax scheme known as the worldwide
combined reporting (WWCR) method.3 This method of taxation has "pro-
voked sharp criticism from all [the United States] major trading partners."4
Barclays challenged the constitutionality of the unitary method because
California and a handful of other states were the only taxing jurisdictions
* J.D., Cornell Law School, 1996; B.S. Atlantic Union College, Summa Cum Laude,
1993.
1. Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994). The scope of
this Note is limited to the Barclays portion of the case. In the Supreme Court, Barclays
was combined with Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., No. 92-1839. Bar-
clays involved the constitutionality of California's corporate tax scheme as applied to a
foreign corporation with either a foreign parent or foreign subsidiaries and to a domestic
corporation with a foreign parent. This question was specifically left open in Container
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 463 U.S. 159, 189 n.26 (1983). The Colgate
case involved the same factual situation challenged in Container Corp.-a domestic par-
ent with foreign subsidiaries. Therefore, this Note will not include an analysis of
Colgate.
2. The term multinational is used in this Note to denote any corporation with oper-
ations in more than one country. The concept of corporate operations extends to corpo-
rate subsidiaries and affiliated corporations. Thus, multinational refers to the family of
related affiliated and subsidiary corporations of a parent corporation.
The dispute in Barclays revolves around the application of worldwide combined
reporting to a subgroup of multinationals: "domestic corporations with foreign parents
.. [and] ... foreign corporations with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries."
Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2271 (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 189 n.26). The terms
"domestic" and "foreign" refer to the country of incorporation or residence.
3. DONALD T. REGAN, CHARmMAN's REPORT ON THE WORLDWIDE UNrIrARY TAXATION
WORKING GROUP: Acnvrrms, IssuEs, AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1, TAX NOTES INT'L, Sept.
1984, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNI File, 84 TNI 9-4.
4. Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Allen Wallis, Statement to the
Worldwide Unitary Taxation Group (1984), in SupLmEMNTAL VEws To CHrMMAI's
REPORT ON WORLDWIDE UNrIARY TAXATION WORKING GROUP, TAx NOTES INT'L, Sept. 1984,
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNI File, 84 TNI 9-5.
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in the world to apply this controversial system to multinationals.5
Although Barclays is a U.S. Supreme Court decision, it only affects
foreign companies.6 Even without regard to the recent litigation, Califor-
nia's tax scheme is of international significance for two reasons. First, the
California tax is considered a "source of instability in the international tax
environment" 7 because it threatens international tax standards. Second,
many multinational corporations have a presence in California since Cali-
fornia's economy is "larger than most nations of the world."8 Although
numerous foreign countries have vigorously opposed California's scheme
through economic, political, and judicial action,9 the protest has been
fruitless.
California should not have won in Barclays. The Supreme Court did
not adequately address the international concerns implicated in Barclays.
California's tax scheme often results in double taxation by reaching profits
earned by foreign multinationals in foreign countries, profits which are
already taxed by foreign jurisdictions. 10 Both the companies and their gov-
ernments find this practice offensive." Thus, California's tax practice cre-
ates substantial waves in foreign policy and international economics. The
Supreme Court in Barclays sanctioned California's foray into international
relations. The Court ignored the crucial distinction between foreign own-
ership of a multinational, as in Barclays,12 and domestic ownership of a
multinational, as in Container Corp.13
5. See Brief for Barclays Bank, Petitioner at 6, Barclays (No. 92-1384). The separate
accounting method is "universally used" by other nations of the world. Id. at 5-6. See
infra note 216. As of 1984, twelve states applied some version of WWCRI REGAN, supra
note 3, § 1.
6. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2271.
7. ADRIAN OGLEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL TAX-A MULTINATIONAL PERSPEC-
TIVE 169 (1993).
8. James F. Devitt, A Corporate Taxpayer-U.S. Parent, Address Before Tax Founda-
tion Seminar (May 10, 1984) in STATE INCOME TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS: PRocEErNGs OF A TAx FOUNDATION SEMINAR 11 (1984).
9. Countries involved as amid in the Barclays litigation included the United King-
dom, Brief for the Government of the United Kingdom as Amicus Curiae, Barclays (No.
92-1384), the United States, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Barclays (No.
92-1384), Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, and Spain, Brief of the Member States of the European Communities
and the Governments of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden
and Switzerland as Amici Curiae, Barclays (No. 92-1384).
10. Common practice dictates that the country of corporate residence has the power
to tax all corporate profits. Thus, if a company is located in several jurisdictions, the
jurisdiction of residence has the right to tax all corporate income. The other countries
in which the company operates will have the right to tax only the income generated
within their jurisdiction. OGLEY, supra note 7, at 31. California's tax is offensive
because it often results in California taxing more than the world-accepted amount of
California source income.
11. See Letter from Sir Michael Grylls, Member United Kingdom House of Com-
mons, to Alfred E. Alquist, California State Senator (Aug. 17, 1993), TAX NOTES TODAY,
Aug. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 93 TNT 172-27.
12. 114 S. Ct 2268.
13. 463 U.S. 164.
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This Note criticizes the Barclays decision. Part I explores the history of
the tax controversy and explains California's taxing scheme, including
recent legislative developments. Part II analyzes Barclays' arguments to the
Supreme Court and discusses the international reaction to the decision.
Part III criticizes the Supreme Court's decision and argues that the unique
international nature of California's tax and the global nature of commerce
demand a different result.
I. WWCR Tax History
A. Background to the WWCR Controversy
The historical roots of WWCR' 4 extend back to the 1870s.15 The precur-
sors to WWCR first arose in the area of property taxation of railroads.' 6
Taxing jurisdictions needed a scheme to divide the value of a taxpaying
entity among the jurisdictions in which the taxpayer operated. 17 Their
solution was the percentage apportionment method. For example, Illinois
adopted a state railroad tax in 1872 that "attributed the tax to each county,
city or town by reference to the length of track within the locality, com-
pared with the total length of track."18 Later, when states began to insti-
tute state corporate income taxes, they extended apportionment from
property taxes to state income taxes. 19 For corporations earning income in
multiple taxing jurisdictions, apportionment was suited to determining
how much income should be taxed by each jurisdiction.20 The apportion-
ment method for income tax assigned a percentage of the corporate income
to that state based upon the ratio of the corporation's in-state activities to
the corporation's entire activities.2 1
The development of the WWCR method also involved a separate con-
cept known as "combined business." 22 While apportionment determines
14. See Benjamin F. Miller, Worldwide Unitary Combination: The California Practice,
in THE STATE CORPORATION INCOME TAX: ISSUES IN WORLDWIDE UNITARY COMBINATION 132
(Charles E. McLure, Jr. ed., 1984). WWCR involves two distinct concepts-apportion-
ment and combination. "[A]pportionment concerns the division of the income base;
combined reporting deals directly with the calculation of the income base." Id.
15. OGLEY, supra note 7, at 170.
16. Id.
17. Miller, supra note 14, at 132.
18. OGLEY, supra note 7, at 170.
19. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 25101-02 (West 1992). Miller, supra note 14, at 132.
20. REGAN, supra note 3, § 1.
21. See DONALD J.S. BREAN, INTERNATIONAL ISSUES IN TAXATION: THE CANADIAN PER-
SPECTIVE 121 (1984). A state that uses the percentage apportionment method deter-
mines the amount of income to be apportioned to that state. The amount to be
apportioned is a percentage of the corporation's total income. The applicable percent-
age is determined by formula. The formula consists of some combination of percentage
apportionment factors. The typical apportionment factors are the ratio of in-state sales
to total sales, in-state payroll to total payroll, and in-state aggregate property value to
total aggregate property value. Id.
22. The combined business concept must be distinguished from the consolidated
return. The consolidated return is a part of the U.S. federal income tax law which allows
certain related corporations to be treated as a single taxpayer for purposes of filing one
return. The combined business concept is used simply to determine the tax base of each
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what percentage of the tax base the state is eligible to tax, the combined
business concept determines the total tax base.23 The combined business
concept looks beyond traditional corporate boundaries and groups
together the incomes of corporations related by the factual existence of
unity of operation, management, and ownership. 24 As a result, the aggre-
gation of the incomes of many related corporations determines the income
tax base of a single member of the group. Thus, when combined reporting
is joined with apportionment formulas, a percentage of the combined
group's total income is consequently assigned as the taxable income of
each member of the combined group operating in the taxing state.25
Combined reporting originated in California during the 1930s. 26 The
paradigm situation consisted of a motion picture company in California
which produced movies in California but transferred the finished films to a
related out-of-state corporation for distribution.27 Prior to combined
reporting, this practice allowed a corporation to avoid subjecting its distri-
bution income to California income tax. The production costs were
located in California, but the chief source of revenue, movie distribution,
was moved outside California.28 California responded with the combined
report, which enabled it to cross traditional corporate boundaries and add
out-of-state distribution income to the in-state income to create a combined
tax base. California then applied apportionment to the combined unitary
tax base to determine the amount of the combined income attributable to
California. 29
With the growth of international trade, "it required only a small step
for... [California] to extend this basis of taxation to apply to the world-
wide profits of multinational companies."30 During the 1960s, California
began to apply combined reporting to groups of related corporations with
worldwide operations to create worldwide corporate groups. 31 Then, in
the early 1970s, California instituted WWCR as its rule and allowed the
separate accounting method only as a rare exception.32 The Barclays litiga-
member of the combined group. Each member of the group must file its own tax return.
See Miller, supra note 14, at 136-37.
23. Id.
24. OGLEY, supra note 7, at 170.
25. See David R. Milton, A Corporate Taxpayer-Foreign Parent, Address Before Tax
Foundation Seminar (May 10, 1984) in STATE INCOME TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS: PROCEEDINGS OF A TAx FOUNDATION SEMINAR 13 (1984).
26. Miller, supra note 14, at 137.
27. Id.
28. Id. The distribution income was most likely moved to a state with minimal or no
income tax.
29. Miller, supra note 14, at 137.
30. OGLEY, supra note 7, at 170.
31. Miller, supra note 14, at 139.
32. Id. Why California's system of taxation is referred to as the worldwide com-
bined reporting method should be clear from the above discussion. California combines
the worldwide profits of all related corporations to define the apportionment tax base.
The California system has a multitude of names. These include the Unitary Method,
Worldwide Unitary Combined Reporting, Worldwide Unitary Method, and other varia-
1996 Victory for a World Pariah
tion, involving the 1977 tax year, arose in this era.3 3
B. History of Barclays
1. Prior WWCR Litigation
Barclays is the most recent in a long line of Supreme Court cases litigating
aspects of the WWCR method of taxation.34 Barclays descends directly
from the Supreme Court case Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax
Board.3 5 Container Corp. litigated Due Process and Commerce Clause
issues raised by California's WWCR scheme as applied to a domestic mul-
tinational corporation.3 6
The plaintiff in Container Corp., Container Corporation of America
(Container), was a domestic manufacturer of paper products headquar-
tered in Illinois and incorporated in Delaware.3 7 Container was an affiliate
of Mobil Oil Corporation 38 and had twenty foreign subsidiaries in Latin
America also engaged in the manufacture of paper products.3 9 Thus,
Container was a U.S. domestic corporation with foreign subsidiaries.
tions of these terms. While cited materials may use a variety of these terms, the text of
this Note will use the single term WWCR.
WWCR is often referred to as the Unitary Method because the combined reporting
aspect of WWCR uses the unitary business concept. The unitary business doctrine
defines which corporate affiliates and subsidiaries are included in the combined group.
While the term "unitary" is not explicitly defined in the text, for purposes of this Note, it
suffices to say that the unitary business doctrine is broad enough to include most, if not
all, of the related corporations in the group. An in-depth discussion of the unitary con-
cept is omitted since Barclays did not challenge the unitary doctrine and, in fact, con-
ceded that it was a unitary group. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2275.
The separate accounting method is the competing system of dividing corporate profits
between competing jurisdictions. "It determines the income of commonly-controlled
corporations on a corporation by corporation basis and does not take into consideration
the income of affiliated corporations not operating within the taxing jurisdiction."
REGAN, supra note 3, § 1. Thus, as the name suggests, each related corporation is treated
as a separate entity for tax purposes. A jurisdiction using separate accounting which
hosts a foreign company only taxes corporate income earned in the host jurisdiction.
Petitioner's Brief at 9; Barclays (No. 92-1384). Separate accounting is also referred to as
the arm's length method because the major problem with separate accounting is tax
avoidance by related corporations by using nonmarket prices for transactions between
related corporations. The text of this Note will use the term separate accounting; titles
and quotes may use equivalent terms. Thus, transactions between related corporations
must be recast to arm's length prices using rules known as Transfer Pricing to prevent
corporate tax avoidance. See REcAN, supra note 3, § 1.
33. Barclays, 114 S. Ct at 2273.
34. Id. See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 164 (listing citations of past WWCR cases
in section IA).
35. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 159.
36. The appellant in Container Corp., Container Corporation of America, was at the
time of litigation a unit of Mobil Corporation. BRIAN, supra note 21, at 123.
37. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 171. See also James Buresh, Analysis of the U.S.
Supreme Court Case of Container Corporation of America v. [California] Franchise Tax
Board, Address Before Tax Foundation Seminar (May 10, 1984) in STATE INCOME TAXA-
TION OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: PROCEEDINGS OF A TAX FOUNDATION SEMINAR 2
(1984).
38. See BRxAN, supra note 21, at 123.
39. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 171-72.
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Container's California state tax return included its own income, but did
not include the income of any of its affiliates.40 California audited
Container and concluded that, because Container and its twenty foreign
subsidiaries were a unitary business, Container's tax liability was greater
than it had reported.41
Container's challenge to the assessment was unsuccessful in the lower
state courts42 and it appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.43 Three issues
were challenged in the Supreme Court: first, whether Container and its
subsidiaries comprised a unitary business;44 second, whether application
of WWCR to a domestic multinational violated the constitutional require-
ment of fair apportionment; 45 and third, whether California was required
by the Foreign Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution to use separate
accounting.46
The Supreme Court ruled against Container on all three issues, find-
ing that Container and its foreign subsidiaries comprised a unitary busi-
ness.4 7 The Supreme Court held that, as applied to a domestic
multinational, WWCR results in fair apportionment.48 The fair apportion-
ment standard arises out of both the Due Process Clause and the Com-
merce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.49 According to the Court, a tax
would not meet the standard of fair apportionment if first, "the income
attributed to the state is in fact 'out of all appropriate proportions to the
business transacted ... in that state,' 50 and, second, that the apportion-
ment "has 'led to a grossly distorted result."'5' Container argued that,
because its foreign subsidiaries were far more profitable than its California
operations, the WWCR method assigned a disproportionate share of its
40. Id. at 174
41. Id. at 175. Container's parent, Mobil Oil, was evidently not included in
Container's unitary group since Mobil Oil is not "engaged in the same line of business"
as Container. Id. at 178. Mobil is an oil company while Container is a producer of
paper products.
42. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 117 Cal. Ct. App. 3d 988 (1981).
43. Id., prob. juris. noted, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
44. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 163.
45. Id.
46. Id. The Foreign Commerce Clause is the same constitutional clause as the Com-
merce Clause. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8. Taxation of foreign commerce, however, creates
additional concerns and requires a more stringent analysis. The Foreign Commerce
Clause states that "[t]he Congress shall have power.., to regulate commerce with for-
eign Nations." Id. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
47. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 180. This Note will not pursue the unitary business
issue. Barclays conceded that it fit into California's definition of a unitary business.
Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2276. Rather, Barclays challenged the way California taxed what
it defined as a unitary business.
48. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 185.
49. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Court does not elabo-
rate on how the fair apportionment standard arises out of these clauses. Container
Corp., 463 U.S. at 170.
50. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 170.
51. Id.
612 Vol. 29
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income to California,52 resulting in a fourteen percent increase in its Cali-
fornia tax liability.5 3 The Supreme Court held that these consequences did
not violate the fair apportionment standard. The Court reasoned that the
theoretical underpinnings of WWCR reject the notion of a geographical
profit, but instead support the notion that "profitability arise[s] from the
operation of the business as a whole."5 4 Although WWCR did assign
greater income to California, the Court found it to be fair because it
accounted for income arising from "economies of scale."5 5 The additional
fourteen percent tax liability arising under WWCR was deemed not to be a
grossly disproportionate result. The Court noted that fourteen percent was
a "far cry" from the 250% difference in a case which failed the gross dis-
proportion test.5 6
The Court then addressed the third issue-whether the Foreign Com-
merce Clause required California to use separate accounting. Because the
unitary group in Container Corp. included twenty foreign subsidiaries, the
international effects of California's tax required scrutiny under the Foreign
Commerce Clause.5 7 Japan Line Ltd. v. County of L.A. established a two-
pronged test for applying the Foreign Commerce Clause to a state tax
scheme.5 8 A tax violates this clause if the state tax either "creates a sub-
stantial risk of international multiple taxation,"5 9 or "prevents the Federal
Government from 'speaking with one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments.' 60 The first prong addresses the con-
cem that enforcing the fair apportionment requirement in foreign com-
merce is more difficult because there is no court "capable of ensuring that
52. Id. at 182. This is because the California tax system allocated profit from a for-
eign jurisdiction to California.
53. Id. at 184.
54. Id. at 181 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,438
(1980)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 184. See Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S.
123 (1931).
57. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 185.
58. Japan Line Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979). Japan Line involved
a property tax by Los Angeles County on international shipping containers that passed
through the port of Los Angeles. The shipping containers were foreign-owned, and the
foreign states levied their own property tax. The country tax was fairly apportioned and
nondiscriminatory. The Supreme Court, however, found the tax unconstitutional under
the Foreign Commerce Clause. Id. The tax produced double taxation since the contain-
ers were taxed by both Los Angeles County and the foreign nation. Id. at 452. The tax
also frustrated a federal policy, evidenced in a treaty, of a uniform treatment of taxes on
containers. Id.
59. Id. at 451.
60. Id. (internal citation omitted). The policy underlying the one voice test is
whether "the taxation of foreign commerce may necessitate a uniform national rule." Id.
at 449. Hence, the term one voice arises from the question of whether the United States
needs to project a single policy to the world rather than each state declaring its own
policy willy-nilly. The basic operation of the one voice test of the Foreign Commerce
Clause is to invalidate conflicting state policies in areas where federal uniformity is
essential. Issues of international trade which implicate foreign affairs are matters in
which federal uniformity is necessary. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.
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the aggregation of taxes is computed on no more than one full value. ''61
Because "foreign commerce is pre-eminently a matter of national [rather
than state] concern," 62 the second prong focuses on foreign policy. State
taxes on international companies risk foreign policy problems such as
"international disputes"63 and "foreign... retaliat[ion]." 64
The Supreme Court found no Foreign Commerce Clause violation in
Container Corp. It distinguished Japan Line on several grounds: first,
Container Corp. was an income tax case while Japan Line involved a prop-
erty tax; second, in Container Corp., the Court found that double taxation
was inevitable under any alternative California income tax scheme while
the double tax in Japan Line could have been avoided if the taxing author-
ity had abandoned its unjustified tax; finally, the tax in Container Corp. fell
on a domestic corporation rather than on a foreign corporation as in Japan
Line.65 Because there was no enhanced risk of multiple taxation, the first
prong was not violated. The Court reasoned that there was no way to avoid
double taxation of income since separate accounting66 "would not by any
means guarantee an end to double taxation."67 The other available method
to avoid double taxation would have been for California not to tax any of
Container's income.68 In response to this option, the Supreme Court
stated that "its obvious unfairness requires no elaboration."6 9 Finding no
reasonable alternative, the Court found no violation of the first prong of
the Foreign Commerce Clause. 70
The Supreme Court also found no violation of the second prong. A
state tax must implicate foreign affairs rather than merely having a "foreign
resonance" to violate the second prong.71 Such foreign policy implication
of a state tax would include "the threat it might pose of offending our for-
eign trading partners and leading them to retaliate against the Nation as a
whole."72 Foreign retaliation was unlikely in Container Corp. because the
tax in Container Corp. was imposed on a domestic corporation, rather than
on a foreign corporation as in Japan Line.73 Thus, the second prong was
not violated.
61. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447-48.
62. Id. at 448.
63. Id. at 450.
64. Id.
65. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 187-88.
66. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
67. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 190.
68. Id. at 187-88.
69. Id. at 190.
70. "[l]t would be perverse, simply for the sake of avoiding double taxation, to
require California to give up one allocation method that sometimes results in double
taxation in favor of another allocation method that also sometimes results in double
taxation." Id. at 193.
71. Id. at 194.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 195.
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2. Barclays Lower Court History
The Container Corp. Court upheld the California tax as applied to a domes-
tic multinational but stated that there was "no need to address ... the
constitutionality of combined apportionment with respect to state taxation
of domestic corporations with foreign parents or foreign corporations with
either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries." 74 Barclays challenged this
issue. The two plaintiffs in Barclays were Barclays Bank International, a
United Kingdom company, and Barclays Bank of California, a company
incorporated in California but wholly owned by Barclays Bank Interna-
tional. 75 Barclays Bank International was a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Barclays Bank Limited, a United Kingdom corporation, and the ultimate
parent corporation.76
Barclays reached the Supreme Court by way of California's state court
system.77 The actual dispute between the two Barclays affiliates and the
California Franchise Tax Board began when Barclays Bank International
and Barclays Bank of California filed their respective 1977 tax returns. Bar-
clays Bank of California's return included only its domestic income; it did
not include itself as part of any unitary group.7 8 Barclays Bank Interna-
tional's return included its income and the income of a group consisting of
itself and its subsidiaries but excluding its parent corporation and its other
affiliates. 7 9 The California Franchise Tax Board audited both returns and
determined that both Barclays Bank International and Barclays Bank of Cal-
ifornia were part of a worldwide unitary group, the Barclays Group, consist-
ing of 220 corporations.80 Using its WWCR methodology, California
assessed Barclays Bank International and Barclays Bank of California an
additional $4,076 and $254,699 in liability respectively. 8 1 Administrative
proceedings subsequently reduced the additional liability to $1,678 and
$152,420.82 Barclays Bank International and Barclays Bank of California
paid these assessments and filed suit for a refund in California Superior
Court.8 3
Barclays based its trial court claim on the Commerce and Due Process
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.84 Barclays argued that foreign corpora-
74. Id. at 189 n.26.
75. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Barclays (No. 92-1384).
76. Id. Barclays Bank Limited, the ultimate parent during the tax year in issue,
1977, later changed to Barclays Bank PLC. This is the entity that pursued the litigation
in the Supreme Court as the successor in interest. Barclays Bank PLC is now a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Barclays PLC. Id. at 5.
77. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2272.
78. Id. at 2274.
79. Id.
80. Petitioner's Brief at 4, 8, Barclays (No. 92-1384).
81. Id. at 8.
82. Id.
83. Eric J. Coffill, Supreme Court In Barclays Upholds California's Use Of Worldwide
Unitary Method Involving Foreign Parent Corporation, at Background, TAx NOTES TODAY,
July 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 94 TNT 141-58.
84. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Barclays (No. 92-1384); Coffill, supra note 83, at 6; U.S.
CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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tions faced a discriminatory burden in violation of the Commerce Clause
and Due Process Clause. The burden consisted of the additional compli-
ance costs of converting all records to U.S. accounting standards-a cost
not borne by domestic corporations.85 Barclays also argued that the Cali-
fornia tax scheme violated the foreign policy prong of the Japan Line For-
eign Commerce Clause test since there was an adverse impact on foreign
affairs.8 6 Barclays prevailed at trial and in the California Court of
Appeals.8 7 California appealed the case to the California Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court reversed the lower courts on the Foreign
Commerce Clause issue 8 and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals
for further hearing on the Due Process issue and other Commerce Clause
issues.8 9 On this second trip to the California Court of Appeals, Barclays
lost on its remaining claims.90 Barclays' further appeals in the California
system were denied and the case proceeded to the U.S. Supreme Court on a
writ of certiorari.91
C. Past International Objections to WWCR
Foreign government objection to the WWCR system has not been confined
to the briefs filed in Barclays' support, but extends back at least fifteen
years in the form of diplomatic notes.92 Foreign governments are unable to
negotiate directly with California, a sub-national unit, and have directed
their diplomatic complaints to the U.S. government in hopes that the
United States would either preempt California through federal law or pres-
sure California into dropping WWCR.93 In 1980, the government of the
United Kingdom and the government of Italy, in its representative capacity
as president of the European Community, expressed opposition to Califor-
nia's WWCR method with diplomatic notes sent to the U.S. government. 94
Italy explained that the European Community members were "concerned
about.., the unitary basis of taxation as applied in California" and urged
the United States to adopt legislation ending WWCR.95 In its Diplomatic
Note of March 25, 1980, the United Kingdom stated that "Her Majesty's
85. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
86. Petitioner's Brief at 13, Barclays (No. 92-1384). Barclays noted that Canada,
Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and West Ger-
many protested California's tax. Id. at 6.
87. Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1342 (1990).
88. The California Supreme Court reversed the lower courts by holding that the Cali-
fornia tax system did not violate the Foreign Commerce Clause. Barclays Bank v.
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 2 Cal. 4th 708 (1992). See supra notes 57-64 and accompany-
ing text.
89. Barclays Bank, 2 Cal. 4th 708.
90. Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742 (1992).
91. Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742, cert. granted,
510 U.S. 943 (1993).
92. See supra note 9.
93. Petitioner's Brief at 7, Barclays (No. 92-1384). See Erica Stary, Current Tax Intel-
ligence, 1984 BRrr. TAx REv. 385, 536.
94. Diplomatic Note, Italy-U.S., Mar. 19, 1980. Diplomatic Note, U.K-U.S., No. 51,
Mar. 25, 1980.
95. Diplomatic Note, Italy-U.S., Mar. 19, 1980.
Vol. 29
1996 Victory for a World Pariah
Government is convinced that the unitary basis of taxation with combined
reporting, particularly as applied in the international field, is entirely
unsatisfactory."96 In 1982, in anticipation of the Supreme Court's hearing
of Container Corp., Canada sent the State Department notice of its objec-
tions to the unitary tax.97 Canada stated that WWCR "results in inequita-
ble taxation and imposes excessive administrative burdens on international
companies doing business in those [unitary method] states."98 Canada
requested that the U.S. government include Canada's view in any U.S. gov-
ernment participation in the Container Corp. litigation. These notices
prior to the decision in Container Corp. placed the United States on notice,
years before the Barclays litigation, of significant international objection to
California's WWCR method.
The Supreme Court's decision to uphold WWCR in Container Corp.
prompted another round of international complaints directed against
WWCR- 99 Greece, as president of the European Community, expressed
the European Community's continued dissatisfaction with WWCR via a
diplomatic correspondence on August 1, 1983.100 This Diplomatic Note
urged congressional legislation "to ensure that States do not use [the uni-
tary] method of taxation at least for the subsidiaries of foreign corpora-
tions."''1 In a Diplomatic Note of August 11, 1983, Japan also vigorously
protested the WWCR system. 10 2 Japan bluntly stated that WWCR is a
"barrier to the expansion and development of Japan-U.S. economic rela-
tions"10 3 and insisted upon "abolition of the Unitary Tax System." 104
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau sent U.S. President Ronald Rea-
gan a personal letter indicating Canadian displeasure with the Container
96. Diplomatic Note, U.K-U.S., No. 51, Mar. 25, 1980.
97. Diplomatic Note, Canada-U.S., No. 283, June 14, 1982. Canada, like the United
States, is a federal system with both the national government and sub-national units that
assess corporate income taxes. J. HARvEY PERRY, TAXATiON IN CANADA 133 (1984). A
comparison of the U.S. and Canadian tax systems reveals that the Canadian provinces
allocate income of foreign countries in accord with international tax conventions. Id.
Canadian provinces have the option of administering their own tax or authorizing the
federal government to collect the provincial tax. Under the federal collection option, the
provincial tax is simply a percentage of the federal tax liability. Id. at 120. Since the
Canadian federal government applies a separate accounting analysis to determine how
much of a foreign owned corporation's income is amenable to Canadian tax, each prov-
ince using the federal option is limited to taxing only Canadian Income. See id. at 74.
The provinces which administer their own corporate taxes are constrained by a system
of federal rules which are in compliance with international tax standards. Id. at 133.
The Canadian example demonstrates that it is possible for a country with numerous
taxing political subdivisions to live harmoniously within the international tax
community.
98. Diplomatic Note, Canada-U.S., No. 283, June 14, 1982.
99. REGAN, supra note 3, § 1 ("In the wake of the Container decision,. . . major trad-
ing partners of the United States renewed their objections to the worldwide unitary tax
method.").
100. Diplomatic Note, Greece-U.S., Aug. 1, 1983.
101. Id.
102. Diplomatic Note, Japan-U.S., Aug. 11, 1983.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Corp. decision and California's continued use of WWCR.10 5 These formal
notes and personal letters indicate the extent of the international commu-
nity's hostility to WWCR.
These post-Container Corp. diplomatic objections prompted the Rea-
gan administration to establish the Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working
Group, chaired by Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, to study alternatives
to the unitary system.' 0 6 The Working Group heard the testimony of inter-
ested parties including foreign governments. 10 7 The United Kingdom,
Canada, Japan, Australia, Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and Belgium all either testified before the Working Group or submitted
diplomatic notes indicating their governments' objections to WWCR 0 8
D. Recent Political Developments
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision to hear Barclays, California backed
down for the tax years beginning January 1, 1994, and beyond. On Octo-
ber 6, 1993, California Governor Pete Wilson signed California Senate Bill
671.109 This bill allows multinational corporations to freely elect the
"water's edge" method.1 10 This method, which is less controversial than
WWCR, limits the corporate income California can tax to income earned
by the unitary group in the United States."' This new California legisla-
tion effectively ended California's use of WWCR.
105. Letter from Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, to Ronald Reagan, Presi-
dent of the United States, 1 (Sept. 24, 1983), reprinted in Appellant's and Respondent's
Joint App. Brief Vol. 1 at A-131, Barclays (No. 92-1384).
106. REGAN, supra note 3, § 1.
107. Id.
108. See id. The United Kingdom vigorously objected to WWCR since its companies
have the largest direct investment in the United States and are thus most affected by the
unitary system. See Statement of the United Kingdom before the U.S. Treasury World-
wide Unitary Taxation Working Group, at 69 (1984). See Paper Submitted by the Gov-
ernment of Canada to the U.S. Treasury Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group, at
80 (1984). "The Canadian government considers that the use of unitary tax schemes is
inconsistent with... international investment policy goals." Id. at 87. See Diplomatic
Note, Switzerland-U.S., No. 461.20, Nov. 15, 1983; Diplomatic Note, Germany-U.S.,
Nov. 28, 1983 (delivered to the U.S. Treasury Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working
Group). "A failure to... eliminate the international incidence of unitary taxation might
lead the international community to conclude that the United States ... is no longer
contributing to the international tax order towards which ... nations have worked for so
many years." Id. at 116. See Diplomatic Note, Belgium-U.S., Jan. 25, 1984 (delivered to
the U.S. Treasury Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group).
109. 1993 Cal. Stat. 881. See Coffill, supra note 83, at 7.
110. In response to the recommendations of the U.S. Treasury Worldwide Unitary
Taxation Working Group, REGAN, supra note 3, annex D, (recommending a water's edge
election), California had enacted a water's edge election in 1986. This 1986 election,
however, required the taxpayer to pay a substantial fee and could be unilaterally disre-
garded by the Franchise Tax Board. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE §§ 25115(a), 25111(c)
(West 1992). Simply, the election was onerous. See Coffill, supra note 83, at 7. Foreign
governments interpreted California's retention of the power to disregard the water's edge
election as "a continuing refusal [by California] to accept the validity of separate
accounting." Unitary Tax: The Next Stage, 1986 Bar. TAx REv. 253.
111. Coffill, supra note 83, at 7.
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The "water's edge" method limits the reach of state corporate income
taxes to income earned within the U.S. boundary. The traditional water's
edge rule provides that "the states cannot look beyond the water's edge,
that is beyond the nation's boundaries, in calculating in-state corporate
income." 112 Any state that applies the water's edge method taxes, at maxi-
mum, the corporation's U.S. income. The traditional water's edge method,
however, treats related corporations as independent for tax purposes.-13
The traditional water's edge method, then, applies separate accounting to
accurately value transactions between related corporations. 114
The California water's edge election is not the traditional water's edge
method, but an "elective variation."" l 5 California's water's edge method
establishes a smaller unitary group, one limited to specified "affiliated enti-
ties" with defined relationships to the United States."16 California Revenue
and Taxation Code section 25110 defines the related entities to be
included in the water's edge group.1" 7 The California method does not
truly adopt separate accounting since it does not treat related corporations
112. George N. Carlson & Harvey Galper, Water's Edge Versus Worldwide Unitary
Combination, in THE STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAX: ISSUES IN WORLDWIDE UNrrARY Com-
BINATION 1, 2 (Charles E. McLure, Jr. ed., 1984).
113. Id.
114. See supra note 32.
115. Brief for United Kingdom as Amicus Curiae at 18, Barclays (No. 92-1384).
116. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25110 (West Supp. 1994). Eric J. Coffill, A Kinder,
Gentler 'Water's Edge' Election: California Wards Off Threats of U.K. Retaliation as Part of
Comprehensive Business Incentive Tax Package, TAX NoTEs INT'L, Oct. 25, 1993, at Intro-
duction, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNI File, 93 TNI 205-11.
117. The California water's edge group consists of seven types of related corporations.
The first is affiliated banks and corporations that are includable in a federal consoli-
dated return filed by the California taxpayer but excluding those making an election
under 26 U.S.C. § 936; CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 25110(a)(1) (West 1992). Second,
Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC) and Foreign Sales Corporations
(FSC) are included in the group. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 25110(a)(2). DISCs and
FSCs are special corporations established primarily for export of goods and are given
favorable tax treatment. BLAciC's LAW DicnoNARY 484 (6th ed. 1990); Bruce and Lieber-
man, 264-4th T.M., Foreign Sales Corporations A4. Third, the group includes corpora-
tions, but not banks, whose own apportionment factors, ratio of U.S. sales, payroll, and
property to worldwide corporate sales, payroll and property, averages greater than 20%
in the United States. CAL. REv. & TAX. COD § 25110(a)(3). These include some foreign
incorporated members of the group which do substantial business, as evidenced by the
20% apportionment average, in the United States. Coffill, supra note 116, at 2. Fourth,
affiliated U.S. incorporated banks and corporations which have more than 50% of their
stock controlled directly or indirectly by the taxpayer and are not eligible to be included
in a federal consolidated return are included. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 25110(a)(4).
Fifth, foreign incorporated banks and corporations which are not included in any other
category which, under the Internal Revenue Code of the United States, have income
attributable to the United States, are included to the extent of the U.S. income. CAL REV.
& TAX. CODE § 25110(a)(5). Sixth, affiliated export trade corporations as defined in
Internal Revenue Code § 970-72 are included. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 25110(a)(6).
Last, a portion of controlled foreign corporations as defined by Internal Revenue Code
§957 are included. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 25110(a)(7). Income of affiliated con-
trolled foreign corporations is only included to the extent of a technical ratio of a certain
class of federal income to earnings. See Coffill, supra note 116, at 2.
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independently.' 18 The California water's edge method still uses a com-
bined group, consisting of related corporations with U.S. contacts, as well
as apportionment factors using U.S. rather than worldwide totals. 119 The
tax base apportioned under the water's edge system is the total income of
the U.S.-related corporations rather than the total income of the worldwide
group. 120 The apportionment ratios are determined using, for example,
the ratio of the taxpaying company's California sales to the total sales of all
related U.S. group corporations. 12 1 This method effectively results in Cali-
fornia's taxing member corporations of foreign multinationals only "on the
basis of its U.S .... operations." 122
California's new legislation has been widely interpreted as a retreat in
the face of international pressure.123 The most notable example of the
international pressure came from the British Government. In 1985, the
United Kingdom increased the international pressure on California by
passing legislation in retaliation against California's tax scheme.124 This
legislation would withdraw certain United Kingdom tax credits from U.S.
parent multinationals with operations in California and the United King-
dom.125 The retaliatory measure was not immediately operable but rather
was held in reserve.126 In May 1993, the United Kingdom announced that
if California did not propose a satisfactory solution to the WWCR disagree-
ment by the end of 1993, it would place its retaliatory measure into
effect. 127 In August 1993, Michael Grylls, a member of the United King-
dom House of Commons, sent a letter to Alfred Alquist, a member of the
California Senate, emphasizing that Britain's "resolve on retaliation, in the
absence of a satisfactory solution, remain[ed] undiminished and should
not be underestimated." 128 As political pressure from Britain increased,
the Finance Committee in the German Bundestag passed a resolution
threatening retaliation if California did not abandon WWCR "within a rea-
118. California combines certain entities. True separate accounting treats all compa-
nies as independent.
119. See Coffill, supra note 116, at 2.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1.
123. See, e.g., Samuel Slutsky, No Tax Is An Island, California Discovers, FiN. Posr, Oct.
13, 1993, at 16.
124. Finance Act, 1985, § 54 (Eng.). Reenacted, United Kingdom Income and Corpo-
ration Taxes Act, 1988, §§ 812 - 815 (Eng.). This retaliatory measure was enacted but
not activated. The statute withdrew tax from U.S. owned corporations who did business
both in the United Kingdom and California (or some other unitary method state). Peti-
tioner's Brief at 25, Barclays (No. 92-1384).
125. Erica Stary, Current Tax Intelligence, United States: Unitary Tax, 1986 BRrT. TAx
REv. 526, 527.
126. Petitioner's Brief at 25, Barclays (No. 92-1384).
127. Inland Revenue Press Release of May 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Taxana
Library, TNI File.
128. Letter from Sir Michael Grylls, Member United Kingdom House of Commons, to
Alfred E. Alquist, supra note 11.
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sonable period of time."129 In 1993, the European Community also
threatened to retaliate against U.S. industry in response to the WWCR
issue. European Community Tax Commissioner Christiane Scrivener
declared that continued use of WWCR "could lead to retaliatory measures
against American Companies because [the European Community] would
have no other choice." 130
After California's water's edge election was passed in October, the
United Kingdom took credit for forcing the change. 131 California, how-
ever, may have had other motivations for making the change. Rather than
conceding defeat by making the legislative change, California may have
been involved in a calculated attempt to preserve its past victory-Barclays'
defeat in the California court system-by persuading the Supreme Court
not to hear the case because the water's edge legislation resolved the
issue.132 If the Supreme Court chose not to hear the case, California could
keep the billions in contested taxes. In addition, WWCR would be sanc-
tioned as legal should California choose to enact it again. The Clinton
Administration urged this course of action in support of California. In
response to the Supreme Court's request for the U.S. view on granting certi-
orari, the United States submitted a brief in support of California's argu-
ment that the "[l]egislation adopted by California... leads us to conclude
that further review of the decision below is not warranted."' 33 Therefore,
California's water's edge election may not have been merely a bowing to
international pressure to solve the crisis, but rather a strategic move by
California to preserve its state court victory.
II. Analysis of Bardays
This Section analyzes the Barclays case from two perspectives. Section A
analyzes the reasoning and conclusions of the Supreme Court. Section B
considers the international significance of the case as evidenced by the
international reaction to the decision.
A. Analysis of Barclays-Supreme Court
1. Barclays' Arguments
Barclays challenged the California tax scheme on Commerce Clause, Due
Process,, and Foreign Commerce Clause grounds. Barclays presented two
primary claims in the Supreme Court. First, Barclays asserted that WWCR
129. Resolution of German Bundestag Finance Committee Regarding Unitary Taxation in
California, TAx NoTES ToDAYJuly 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File,
93 TNT 147-30.
130. Scrivener Threatens Tax War With United States, REunms, May 11, 1993, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
131. Inland Revenue Press Release, supra note 127. The press release states that
"[tihis development [the California legislation] is a vindication of the Government's deci-
sion to set a definite time limit for the implementation of retaliatory measures." Id.
132. See supra part I.B.2.
133. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Barclays (No. 92-1384) (brief sub-
mitted at request of the Court prior to grant of certiorari).
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caused foreign-based multinationals to incur significant compliance costs
that were not incurred by domestic corporations.1 34 Barclays argued that
this inequality violated the Commerce Clause because the compliance bur-
den discriminated against interstate commerce 135 in violation of Complete
Auto Transit v. Brady.136 According to Complete Auto Transit, a state tax
violates the Commerce Clause if "the tax either (1) applies to an activity
lacking a substantial nexus to the taxing State; (2) is not fairly appor-
tioned; (3) discriminates against interstate commerce; or (4) is not fairly
related to the services provided by the State.1 37 Barclays asserted that
while a foreign multinational must convert its accounting records to U.S.
currency and U.S. accounting conventions,138 a domestic multinational
has its records in U.S. currency and is subject to U.S. accounting guide-
lines. Barclays argued that the significant accounting burden imposed on
foreign-based multinationals placed the foreign companies in a less com-
petitive position, and hence discriminated unconstitutionally. 139
Barclays' second major claim implicated the Due Process Clause. 140
California tax regulations included a provision for the taxpayer to submit
returns based on reasonable approximations to avoid the costly conversion
of the foreign multinational's records to U.S. standards. 141 Barclays
argued that this regulation did not "contain sufficiently explicit standards,
not only to permit a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what
conduct is prohibited, but also to prevent arbitrary, harsh and discrimina-
tory enforcement by government officials." 142 Barclays, citing Grayned v.
City of Rockford,143 Kolender v. Lawson,144 and Papachristou v. City of Jack-
sonville,145 alleged that the Due Process violation stemmed from a vague-
ness problem with the regulation since it required only a reasonable
approximation without further specification of the standard. 146 Barclays
argued that the undefined reasonableness standard granted the California
Franchise Tax Board standardless discretion in violation of Due
Process.147
Barclays also argued that California's tax violated the two-pronged
Foreign Commerce Clause test enunciated in Japan Line.148 According to
134. Barclays, 114 S. Ct at 2277.
135. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3.
136. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
137. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2276 (citing Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279).
138. Petitioner's Brief at 26, Barclays (No. 92-1384).
139. Id.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
141. CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 18 § 25137-6(e) (1991).
142. Petitioner's Brief at 48, Barclays (No. 92-1384).
143. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
144. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1982).
145. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
146. Petitioner's Brief at 29, Barclays (No. 92-1384).
147. Id. at 30.
148. In the area of foreign commerce, two additional tests apply to the validity of a
state tax. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451. These two prongs are: (1) the enhanced risk of
multiple taxation; (2) the state tax impairs federal uniformity in an area where federal
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Barclays, since California's method of taxation implicated foreign policy, it
violated the Japan Line "one voice"149 test. Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs during the Reagan Administration, stated that
"few issues have provoked so broad and intense [a] reaction from foreign
nations."150 The California method engenders this response because it is
at cross purposes with the separate accounting taxation method used inter-
nationally by the United States' major trading partners.151 WWCR unrav-
els "sixty years of cooperative effort among nations to establish the arm's
length method as the exclusive international standard."15 2 Further, the
realized risk of retaliation by foreign nations, most notably the United
Kingdom, coupled with the vigorous complaints of numerous other states,
illustrates the impact of the California tax on foreign affairs.
153
The "enhanced risk of multiple taxation" prong of the Japan Line test
is violated, according to Barclays, by the more aggravated risk of multiple
taxation that a foreign-owned multinational faces in California.' 54 A for-
eign-owned multinational typically has more foreign operations than does
a domestic corporation such as Container, and thus a greater portion of
the foreign multinational's income is subject to a double tax.' 55 The
degree and the risk of double taxation are greater.' 5 6 Over ninety-eight
percent of the Barclays worldwide combined group's income was earned in
countries other than the United States.157 Since Barclays is subject to for-
eign income tax on that ninety-eight percent, Califrnia risks applying a
double tax to a huge proportion of Barclays' income.15 8 Therefore, Califor-
nia's tax certainly subjects foreign multinationals to a more "enhanced risk
of multiple taxation."15 9
2. Supreme Court's Response
The Supreme Court rejected each of Barclays' arguments. The Court first
applied the four-pronged Complete Auto Transit test to determine whether
uniformity is essential (the "one voice" test). Id. See supra notes 58-64 and accompany-
ing text.
149. See supra note 148.
150. Wallis, supra note 4. Wallis stated that the "United States Government has
received diplomatic notes from fourteen member countries of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), either directly or through the European
community, as well as communications from the OECD itself, all protesting against the
application of the unitary tax method to their companies.... The Prime Ministers of
three of [the United States] largest trading partners have written to the President to
express their concern and have raised the issue in personal meetings with him." Id.
151. Petitioner's Brief at 27, Barclays (No. 92-1384).
152. Id.
153. See id. at 25. See supra part I.D.
154. Petitioner's Brief at 32, Barclays (No. 92-1384).
155. Id.
156. Petitioner's Brief at 27, Barclays (No. 92-1384).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446 (emphasis added).
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the California tax violated the Commerce Clause.160 The Court stated,
without further elaboration, that three prongs were "easily met."'161 Bar-
clays argued that the California tax violated the fourth prong, discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce, by imposing a discriminatory compliance
burden. Rejecting this claim for lack of a "factual predicate," 162 the Court
explained that Barclays failed to show that the approximations generally
discriminate against multinational corporations through over-taxation. 163
Further, the Court cited the California regulation allowing "reasonable
approximations" and explained that this provision permitted Barclays to
avoid the allegedly discriminatory compliance costs of converting foreign
accounting records to U.S. standards.164
The Due Process claim was summarily dismissed. The Court's opin-
ion noted both that reasonableness is a common legal standard 165 and that
the California courts had construed the regulation to "curtail the discretion
of California tax officials." 166 Thus, the California Franchise Tax Board
does not have standardless discretion, but is limited by the common stan-
dard of reasonableness.
The Supreme Court extensively analyzed the Foreign Commerce
Clause arguments. First, the Court dismissed the risk of double taxation
claim.167 The Court acknowledged that double taxation had occurred in
Barclays, but pointed out that double taxation had also occurred in
Container Corp.168 The Court explained that the tax in Container Corp.
was upheld because a switch to separate accounting would not have cer-
tainly ended the double taxation and the Court would not order a switch
from one method of double taxation to another.169 Further, in Barclays,
the Court found no evidence that separate accounting would be more
likely to lessen the risk of double taxation for a foreign multinational than
it would for a domestic multinational as in Container Corp.170
The Court dismissed the "one voice" argument in a two-step finding.
First, the Court found no clear federal policy on state taxation of foreign
multinationals. 17 1 Therefore, California's unitary tax was not in direct
conflict with a stated federal policy. In step two, the Court avoided an
160. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2276; Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 274. See supra
notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
161. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2276. The three Commerce Clause tests which the tax did
not violate were: "(1) [the tax] applies to an activity lacking a substantial nexus to the
taxing State; (2) is not fairly apportioned; ... (4) is not fairly related to the services
provided by the state." Id. The easy finding that these tests were met may be explained
by the fact that Barclays did not challenge the tax on any of these grounds. Rather,
Barclays attacked only on discrimination grounds. Id. at 2277.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2278.
164. See supra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
165. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2278. See supra notes 14047 and accompanying text.
166. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2278.
167. Id. at 2281.
168. Id. at 2280.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2281-82.
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application of the Japan Line one voice test by finding that Congress had
approved California's WWCR by negative implication.172 The Court
declared that "Congress may... passively indicate that certain state prac-
tices do not 'impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity
is essential.'" 173 Therefore, Congress can passively approve violations of
the one voice test. The negative implication arose from two sources. First,
the Court noted that Congress was "aware that foreign governments were
displeased with States' worldwide combined reporting requirements" and
failed to enact any bill against it.17 4 Second, the Court found that "[t]he
history of Senate action on a United States/United Kingdom tax treaty...
reinforces our conclusion."175 Since 1975, the United Kingdom and the
United States had been in the process of finalizing a treaty to prevent
double taxation of companies by the two nations. 176 Article 9(4) of the
proposed treaty "restricted the power of the States of the United States to
apply the 'unitary method' of taxation to British enterprises." 177 The
United States Senate "refused to ratify the treaty until this particular clause
was removed."1 78 These two factors sufficiently implied negative congres-
sional intent to prevent the Court from applying the one voice test.
B. International Reaction to Barclays
1. Foreign Government Reaction
The British government reacted negatively to the Barclays decision.179 Fol-
lowing the release of the Barclays decision, the British Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Hon. Kenneth Clarke, issued a statement which demonstrated
the United Kingdom's disappointment with the decision but also hinted at
defeat and resignation. 180 Mr. Clarke stated, "I am naturally disappointed
by the Supreme Court's decision on the Barclays case. The Government
has always strongly opposed the imposition of world-wide unitary tax on
UK owned companies and supported Barclays throughout this litiga-
tion."181 The statement reiterated the United Kingdom's continued dislike
for WWCR but reluctantly accepted California's 1993 water's edge legisla-
172. Id. at 2284.
173. Id. at 2282 (emphasis in original) (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448).
174. Id. at 2283.
175. Id. at 2284.
176. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 31, 1975-Mar. 15, 1979,
U.S.-U.K, 31 U.S.T. 5668. See STAFF OF JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., lsT
SESS., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED THIRD PROTOCOL TO PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY
B wEVEN TE UITra STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 1 (Conn. Print 1979); 12 WAL-
Tm DIAOND & DOROTHY DIAMOND, INTERNATIONAL TAX T.EATmIs OF ALL NATIONS 479
(1982); infra notes 223-35 and accompanying text.
177. DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra note 176, at 479.
178. OGLEY, supra note 7, at 170.
179. British Official Expresses Disappointment In Barclays Decision, TAX NoTs TODAY,
June 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 94 TNT 120-21.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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tion as an adequate resolution to the WWCR dispute. 182
There is lingering international concern that other states, and maybe a
future recalcitrant California legislature, will be emboldened by Califor-
nia's victory in Barclays.183 Mr. Clarke expressed the concern of the
United Kingdom, stating that the United Kingdom would "retain its retalia-
tory powers against the possibility that States might damage UK owned
companies at some time in the future." 184 The U.S. government believes
that WWCR will not spread because of California's experience.1 85 An
immediate return to WWCR by California or adoption by other states in
the near future seems unlikely. The Supreme Court's decision, however,
does leave the door open for a cash-strapped state to adopt a unitary system
to fill the state's coffers at the expense of foreign multinationals after the
international furor dissipates. The continuing concern of the international
community is therefore warranted.
2. New OECD Guidelines Condemning WWCR
The Organisation For Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
issued a discussion draft on July 8, 1994, which condemned the use of
WWCR. 18 6 The OECD issued the report only weeks after the Barclays deci-
sion ofJune 20, 1994. The report noted that WWCR "has not been applied
as between countries although it has been attempted by some local taxing
jurisdictions."18 7 This statement dearly refers to California and the hand-
ful of other states that use WWCR. 188 The report further stated that
WWCR is "not a realistic alternative to the arm's length principle" 189 and
concluded that "global formulary apportionment should be rejected."'190
The OECD's condemnation of WWCR is most likely a response to
threats to the separate accounting standard.19 1 These include California's
182. Id. Mr. Clarke states that the California water's edge legislation is a "major step
forward and it should ensure that in future no UK owned company is exposed to dam-
age there from the imposition of world-wide unitary tax." Id.
183. See More U.S. States May Try Unitary Tax After Barclays Verdict, AFX NEws, June
21, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Non-US File.
184. British Official Expresses Disappointment in Barclays Decision, supra note 179.
185. More U.S. States May Try Unitary Tax After Barclays Verdict, supra note 183.
186. The OECD is an international policy-making organization consisting of govern-
ment delegations from twenty-five leading industrialized countries. Guy De Jonquieres,
OECD Guidelines Seek To Avert Double Tax, FIN. TIMEs, July 9, 1994, at 4. OECD member
countries are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, Finland, Australia, New
Zealand, and Mexico. The European Community also participates in OECD work.
OECD COMM. OF FISCAL AFFAIRS, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTER.
PRISEs AND TAX ADMINISTRATION 1994 DISCUSSION DRAFTr 68 (1994).
187. OECD COMM. OF FISCAL AFFAIRS, supra note 186, at 65.
188. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
189. OECD COMM. OF FISCAL AFFAIRS, supra note 186, at 66.
190. Id. at 68.
191. Leslie B. Samuels, Remarks at the Seventh Annual International Tax Institute
sponsored by the Internal Revenue Service and the George Washington University (Dec.
16, 1994) available in 9 TAx NOTES INT'L 1951 (1994).
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use of WWCR, 192 recent Congressional proposals suggesting revising the
Internal Revenue Code to add an alternate minimum corporate income tax
using WWCR principles, 19 3 and a Congressional proposal to revise the
transfer pricing regulations for Internal Revenue Code § 482.194 The new
proposals would have implemented transfer pricing principles embodying
the WWCR principles. 195 Fortunately, the U.S. Treasury Department never
acted on the proposals and has since embraced the new OECD report,
which rejects the WWCR methodology. 19 6 It takes little imagination to
suspect that the Treasury Department's retreat from the WWCR methodol-
ogy was influenced by California's experience.
III. Criticism of Bardays-The International Problem
The Barclays case was wrongly decided. The holding fails to adequately
account for important international issues and their effects on constitu-
tional analysis. Barclays should have won on Foreign Commerce Clause
grounds because WWCR creates an aggravated risk of multiple taxation
and implicates foreign policy issues. The Supreme Court's Foreign Com-
merce Clause analysis is at fault. The Court relied more on Container
Corp.,197 a case involving tax on a domestic multinational, than on Japan
Line,198 which involved a tax on a foreign multinational and thus was more
relevant. Japan Line recognized the special sensitivity necessary in an inter-
national setting. Further, by using its "negative implication" jurispru-
dence,1 9 9 the Court ignored the relevant portion of the one voice test2° ° as
defined in Container Corp.20 1 Proper treatment of international concerns
as established in Container Corp. and Japan Line, must lead to the conclu-
sion that the Supreme Court's decision is wrong on both prongs of the
Foreign Commerce Clause test.
A. The Supreme Court Was Wrong on the Double Taxation Prong
The double taxation prong of the Foreign Commerce Clause, as stated in
Japan Line and restated in Container Corp., examines whether the state tax
creates an enhanced risk of multiple taxation.20 2 The principles applicable
to taxation of foreign corporations outlined in Japan Line dictate that Cali-
192. OECD Backs "Arm's Length" Taxes For Multinationals, REun-s, July 8, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
193. H.R. 5270, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). See OGLEY, supra note 7, at 171.
194. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2, 57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (1992). See also 26 U.S.C. § 482
(1988). Section 482 is the statute authorizing implementation of transfer pricing rules
which are necessary in a separate accounting jurisdiction. Transfer pricing rules are
needed in separate accounting jurisdictions to prevent corporate tax avoidance by
manipulating transactions between related corporations to minimize tax liability.
195. OGLY, supra note 7, at 171.
196. Samuels, supra note 191, at 1951, 1952.
197. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 159.
198. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 434.
199. See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
201. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2282-83.
202. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446. See also Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 185.
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fornia's WWCR system, as applied to foreign multinationals, is unconstitu-
tional under this prong.
1. The Cause of Double Taxation Under WWCR
The California system creates double taxation because WWCR is inconsis-
tent with the separate accounting standard used by almost all nations of
the world.20 3 While the separate accounting method separately taxes taxa-
ble income derived from book income, California's WWCR assigns a per-
centage of the income of the entire unitary group to California.20 4
Therefore, whenever the taxable income amount derived under WWCR
exceeds the separate accounting amount, California taxes foreign-sourced
income subject to tax by that foreign jurisdiction. As between states taxing
domestic corporations, the Court has approved apportionment of income
by percentage formulas because it can enforce fair apportionment between
the states so that multiple taxation is avoided. 20 5 This feature of American
jurisprudence that prevents domestic double taxation cannot operate in
the international realm, in which case one of the taxing jurisdictions is a
foreign sovereign on which the Supreme Court cannot enforce fair appor-
tionment. Thus, international consensus is the only way to avoid interna-
tional double taxation.20 6
2. Separate Accounting Minimizes Risk of Double Taxation
The Supreme Court objected to imposing the separate accounting method
on California because it reasoned that separate accounting might also
result in double taxation.20 7 Double taxation could occur because the def-
inition of separate accounting may vary from nation to nation.20 8 How-
ever, although some double taxation may result under the separate
accounting method, international custom minimizes this risk because the
international community constantly engages in dialogue to minimize the
differences in separate accounting methodologies. For example, the recent
OECD report, which condemns WWCR, also implements new model rules
on transfer pricing.20 9 Transfer pricing is a significant area of difference
among separate accounting jurisdictions, and the OECD's new rules
attempt to fully achieve "the objectives of... avoiding double taxation."2 10
The international consensus on the separate accounting principle is that it
has an "overwhelming advantage in relation to . . . formulary apportion-
ment."211 Simply put, double taxation will be minimized when all jurisdic-
tions, including California, apply separate accounting. WWCR's
theoretical underpinnings are fundamentally at odds with separate
203. See Milton, supra note 25, at 13.
204. See supra note 32.
205. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445, 447.
206. See Samuels, supra note 191, at 1952.
207. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2280.
208. Samuels, supra note 191, at 1951.
209. See OECD Comm. OF FIscAL AFFAm, supra note 186.
210. Id.
211. Samuels, supra note 191, at 1952.
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accounting principles and thus California is guilty of consciously engaging
in double taxation.
3. Japan Line Compels California's Use of Separate Accounting
Japan Line contains a key principle: "California's tax... must be evaluated
in the realistic framework of the custom of nations."212 Because no single
court can prevent double taxation in the international sphere, it can be
avoided only by following the custom of nations. 213 In Japan Line, interna-
tional custom allowedJapan, the domicile of the owners of the property, to
tax the full value of the property.214 Thus, any tax by Los Angeles, the
taxing authority inJapan Line, resulted in double taxation, which is prohib-
ited under the Commerce Clause.2 15 With this statement, the Supreme
Court recognized the existence of international custom and that, as the
taxing party in violation of international custom, Los Angeles was thus
guilty of charging the double tax. In Barclays, separate accounting is the
international custom, allowing each jurisdiction to tax the value earned
within its borders. 216 Thus, under California's WWCR scheme, each time
a company's taxable income exceeds the company's separate accounting
amount, the company is subject to double taxation by California in the
amount of the excess.
The accepted international framework of corporate income tax on
multinationals is the separate accounting method.217 In Barclays, as in
Japan Line, the double tax results from California's ignoring international
custom, and so California is the jurisdiction guilty of imposing the double
tax. Therefore, the California tax in Barclays should have been found
unconstitutional under the Foreign Commerce Clause as it was in Japan
Line.218 Not only does the separate accounting method have the greatest
tendency to reduce double taxation,219 but the separate accounting
212. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 454.
213. See supra part III.A.1.
214. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447-48.
215. Id.
216. The separate accounting method is universally accepted as the international
standard. The "separate accounting or arm's length principle... is the method adopted
almost universally." Stary, supra note 93, at 536, Separate accounting is "normal" and
"the accepted principle of international taxation practice." Erica Stary, Current Tax
Intelligence, 1983 Brr. TAx REv. cl, c122. The "arm's length standard has been...
universally accepted." Jonathan Schwarz, Survey of World Taxation, Fmn. Tmias, May 20,
1994, at II.
217. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
218. This analysis appears to implicate the double taxation analysis in Container
Corp. Thus, it is distinctly possible that Container Corp. is wrongly decided also. If the
difference of foreign or domestic domicile of the parent multinational makes a constitu-
tional difference in the double taxation analysis, this Note suggests that it is because the
analysis is under the Foreign Commerce Clause which is less concerned with domesti-
cally controlled entities. Nevertheless, this Note is only concerned with the Barclays
opinion and will offer nothing more than speculation on Container Corp. The major
error, then, of the Court's analysis is to follow Container Corp. rather than to apply the
principles of Japan Line.
219. See supra part lI.A.2.
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method is also the custom of nations.220 As such, Japan Line dictates that
California's WWCR system is unconstitutional under the double taxation
prong of the Foreign Commerce Clause and therefore must be replaced by
the separate accounting method.
Admittedly, double taxation is not inevitable under the WWCR
approach; factual circumstances do exist in which California's system does
not result in double tax. Any time the California method does not result in
double tax, however, it is either because California is taxing an income
amount equal to that under the separate accounting method or because
California is taxing a lesser income amount. California is the loser in the
latter case because the jurisdiction is not fully exercising its right to tax
source income. Therefore, it is not constitutionally relevant that WWCR
does not always result in double taxation.
B. The Supreme Court's Application of the One Voice Test Is Flawed
The Supreme Court failed to apply the one voice test22 1 as outlined in
Container Corp. and Japan Line. The Barclays Court did not apply this test
because it found that Congress implicitly had approved the WWCR
method by its failure to pass a bill against state use of WWCR and had
failed to approve a treaty that prevented the states from using WWCR.2 22
Implying congressional intent from congressional inaction is a dangerous
form of jurisprudence. Congress had as much opportunity to explicitly
approve of WWCR as it did to explicitly disapprove of it. Faced with
ambiguous congressional intent, the Court should have applied the one
voice test.
The Supreme Court found that the Senate's treatment of the United
States-United Kingdom Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxa-
tion 223 demonstrates that "Congress implicitly has permitted the States to
use the worldwide combined reporting method."224 This event, however,
was misinterpreted by the Court. At worst, Senate action on the treaty
shows ambivalence. At best, it can be interpreted as explicit disapproval of
California's WWCR method. The original draft of the treaty contained
Article 9(4), which restricted the federal government and political subdivi-
sions, including California, from applying WWCR to United Kingdom mul-
tinationals. 225 When the treaty was presented to the Senate for
ratification, Senator Frank Church proposed an amendment in the Foreign
Relations Committee which would have modified Article 9(4) to remove the
prohibition on a state's use of WWCR. 22 6 This amendment was defeated
in committee by a vote of five in favor and ten against.227 Senator Church's
220. U.S. Supreme Court Upholds California's Use of Worldwide Unitary Taxation,
PRss ASS'N LiMrEm, June 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Panews File.
221. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
222. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2283-84.
223. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 176.
224. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2284 (emphasis added).
225. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, art. 9(4), supra note 176.
226. STAFF op JoiNT Comm. ON TAXATION, supra note 176, at 1.
227. Id.
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amendment was then brought to the Senate floor and was again
defeated. 228 A ratification vote was then taken on the unmodified treaty,
including the prohibition on state WWCR. 229 A majority of Senators
approved the treaty.230 The vote was forty-nine in favor and thirty-two
against.231 Although a majority of senators approved the treaty, it was five
votes short of the Constitutionally-mandated two-thirds majority necessary
to ratify a treaty. 23 2 Thus, despite the failure to ratify the unmodified
treaty, a majority of senators approved of restricting state use of WWCR.
Subsequently, however, the Treasury Department announced that it
would tolerate a treaty which did not restrict state use of WWCR.23 3 A
third protocol was negotiated with the United Kingdom modifying Art.
9(4) to conform to the Church amendment, thus removing the restriction
on state use of WWCR taxation.234 The Senate ratified this final version of
the treaty ninety-eight in favor, none against.235 In doing so, Congress
placed the Court in a difficult situation. Did Congress implicitly approve
state use of WWCR? A majority of senators voted for a treaty which explic-
itly restricted state WWCR taxation while a two-thirds majority ratified a
later version of the same treaty which was silent on the state issue. It
seems a leap for the Court to have found implicit congressional approval of
state WWCR taxation from explicit prohibition and silence. The most that
can be inferred is that the Senate sent ambiguous signals on the issue. The
majority's approval of the prohibition logically precludes a finding of
approval. The Supreme Court was incorrect and should have applied the
one voice test.
Had the Court reached the one voice test, as this Note argues it should
have, the Court should have declared WWCR unconstitutional under the
Foreign Commerce Clause. Container Corp. defines the one voice test rele-
vant to the California tax: "a state tax at variance with federal policy will
violate the 'one voice' standard if it either implicates foreign policy issues
which must be left to the Federal Government or violates a clear federal
directive."236 WWCR violates the foreign policy branch of the test. The
Court suggests in Container Corp. that a state tax interferes with foreign
policy if it might justifiably lead to foreign retaliation.23 7 That retaliation
has occurred-the United Kingdom has enacted retaliatory legislation.238
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. U.S. CONSr. art. II, § 2. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Bar-
clays (No. 92-1384). The apparent anomaly of 49 votes for and 32 against being merely
five votes short of a two-thirds majority in a 100-member body is resolved by U.S. CONSr.
art. II, § 2 which requires approval of only two thirds of the members present to ratify a
treaty.
233. STAFF OF JOINT Co MM. ON TAXATION, supra note 176, at 1.
234. Third Protocol, art. 1(3), 31 U.S.T. 5709-10.
235. 125 CONG. Rac. 17,433 (1979).
236. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194 (emphasis added).
237. Id.
238. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
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Container Corp. lists three circumstances which would justify foreign
retaliation: first, if the tax creates an "automatic 'asymmetry;'" 239 second,
if the tax is imposed on a foreign entity;240 and third, if foreign nations
have a "legitimate interest in reducing the tax burden of domestic corpora-
tions."241 All three factors are implicated in Barclays. First, WWCR does
create an asymmetry. WWCR "disturbs the symmetry of international tax-
ation relationships" 242 and is fundamentally inconsistent with the univer-
sally accepted separate accounting method. The separate accounting
standard is universally accepted. 243 Separate accounting is embodied in
both the OECD Model Tax Convention On Income and On Capital 244 and
the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed
and Developing Countries. 245 Therefore, it is beyond question that the
unitary method creates an asymmetry when compared with the interna-
tional standard.
Second, the legal incidence246 of the tax in Barclays, at least that tax
on the foreign incorporated company, fell on a foreign corporation. There
were two litigants in Barclays: Barclays Bank International, a foreign corpo-
ration, and Barclays Bank of California, a California corporation. Both
were owned by a foreign corporation.247 In a narrow sense, the California
tax on Barclays Bank of California does not fall on a foreign corporation
since it is a California corporation.248 In the broader, multinational struc-
ture, which California is so quick to group with the domestic corporation,
the incidence of the tax falls on the ultimate parent, a foreign corporation.
There can be no doubt that the WWCR tax on Barclays Bank International
falls, in both the narrow and broad senses, on a foreign corporation.
The third factor, a foreign nation's interest in relieving the tax burden
on its corporations, also weighs in Barclays' favor. In Container Corp. the
Supreme Court suggests that corporations, even foreign ones, are subject to
tax in California and that excessive taxation is simply a function of the tax
rate.249 However, the amount of tax paid by a foreign multinational in Cali-
fornia is not merely a function of the tax rate, but is a result of the aberrant
tax system imposed by California.
239. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 195 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Stary, supra note 216, at c122.
243. See supra note 216.
244. OECD Committee On Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Convention On Income and On
Capital, art. 9 (1992).
245. United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and
Developing Countries, art. 9(1) (1980). The commentary to the United Nations Model
Convention assumes that countries apply separate accounting. Commentaries on the
Articles of the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and
Developing Countries, art. 9(A).
246. This refers to which legal entity is obligated to pay the tax.
247. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
249. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 195.
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These factors can be used to distinguish Container Corp., which
upheld WWCR, from the proper result in Barclays. In Container Corp., the
tax ultimately fell on a domestic parent corporation. Thus, the foreign
country hosting the subsidiaries has little to complain about. In Barclays,
however, the legal incidence falls directly on a foreign company when there
is a foreign corporation in California. The legal incidence falls indirectly
on a foreign company in the case of a domestic company with a foreign
parent. A foreign sovereign rightfully is concerned about the effects of
another sovereign's taxes on its corporations.
The Supreme Court stated that "Congress may more passively indicate
that certain state practices do not 'impair federal uniformity in an area
where federal uniformity is essential."' 250 Applying this standard to the
Foreign Commerce Clause undermines the very reason for an extended
Commerce Clause analysis when foreign commerce is in question, because
"sensitive matters of foreign relations.., are concerned."251 This passive
congressional approval standard must be compared with the "unmistaka-
ble clarity"25 2 of Congress that is necessary to save state legislation which
falls short under the four Commerce Clause tests of Complete Auto
Transit.253 Apparently, Congress must take explicit action before it
approves any state practice which would otherwise violate the Commerce
Clause. In the area of foreign commerce, the one voice test of the Foreign
Commerce Clause, which applies only to foreign commerce, evidently can
be overridden by the smallest of congressional action-silent ambiguity.
The Foreign Commerce Clause has the additional two tests which make up
the "more extensive Constitutional inquiry"25 4 when foreign commerce is
in question. A more rigorous test is required because "sensitive matters of
foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned" 255 in foreign
commerce. The Court's insistence that the one voice test may be met by a
lesser congressional action than is necessary for the Complete Auto Transit
tests cannot be reconciled with the logic supporting the existence of the
additional Foreign Commerce Clause tests. The Court appears to provide
special protection for foreign commerce, justified by foreign policy con-
cerns, yet it fatally weakens the one voice test by allowing Congress to over-
ride the test with silence and ambiguity. If matters of foreign commerce
are as delicate as the Court asserts, there is no justification for the lower
standard given the one voice test. The concerns of foreign commerce
should command a constitutional standard far above that applied to
domestic commerce.
250. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2282-83 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448; emphasis in
original; internal citation omitted).
251. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 189 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 456).
252. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2283.
253. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 274. See supra notes 136-37 and accompany-
ing text.
254. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
255. Id. at 456.
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Conclusion
The crisis over California's WWCR method is over for now. The Barclays
decision was wrongly decided. Whether this decision will embolden other
jurisdictions to employ WWCR remains to be seen. Given the interna-
tional-relations firestorm created by California, it seems unlikely. WWCR,
however, affords jurisdictions with high property, sales, and payroll values,
relative to the other jurisdictions in which the unitary group operates, the
opportunity to tax a greater share of the unitary group's income than does
the separate accounting method. This feature may cause states desperate
for revenue to impose WWCR taxation in order to obtain more revenues
from a source commonly viewed as not paying its fair share.256 However,
states must realize that the United States operates in a global economy.
Overtaxing foreign companies can have dire effects on the U.S. economy if
the foreign jurisdiction retaliates. Congress should decide whether to dis-
regard international custom and explicitly approve WWCR or to legislate
against it. This issue has too many foreign and economic policy considera-
tions to be forgotten until the next WWCR crisis emerges. If this issue
comes before the Court again and, as is likely, Congress has not spoken,
the Court should explicitly reject WWCR taxation and recognize the inter-
national custom involved in taxation of multinational corporations.
256. See Schwarz, supra note 216, at II.
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